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THE CASH SELLER'S RIGHT OF RECLAMATION
VERSUS THE SECURED PARTY'S FLOATING LIEN:
WHO IS ENTITLED TO PRIORITY?
In recent years, much litigation' has focused on whether an unpaid cash
seller2 of property or a third party claiming a security interest in the prop-
erty is entitled to priority in recovering the property following the cash
buyer's default.3 The secured party usually has a security interest in the
current inventory and all after-acquired inventory of the buyer.' At com-
mon law and under the Uniform Sales Act (USA),5 the predecessor of
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), unpaid cash sellers
generally prevailed over the claims of bona fide purchasers' of the default-
ing buyer7 and were able to recover goods from lien creditors,8 mortgagees,'
E.g., In re Samuels & Co., 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834'(1976);
First Natl Bank v. Smoker, 153 Ind. App. 71, 286 N.E.2d 203 (1972); Stumbo v. Paul B. Hult
Lumber Co., 251 Ore. 20, 444 P.2d 564 (1968).
2 An unpaid cash seller often is a seller who accepts buyer's payment by a check which
is subsequently dishonored. See Corman, Cash Sales, Worthless Checks and the Bona Fide
Purchaser, 10 VAND. L. Rav. 55, 55 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Corman]; note 28 infra.
The cash buyer's default is usually on both the obligation to the cash seller and to the
secured party, hence the conflict over priority to recover the goods. See, e.g., In re Samuels
& Co., 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Wyoming Nat'l Bank, 505 F.2d 1064
(10th Cir. 1974). Frequently, the property has been sold and the litigants are seeking recovery
of the proceeds. E.g., In re Samuels & Co., 526 F.2d 1238; Greater Louisville Auto Auction,
Inc. v. Ogle Buick, Inc., 387 S.W.2d 17 (Ky. Ct. App. 1965); see text accompanying notes
77-82 infra.
A security interest in all presently owned and after-acquired inventory is created by
the inclusion of an "after-acquired property clause" in the security agreement entered into
by a debtor and his creditor. See U.C.C. § 9-204(1) (all citations are to the Uniform Commer-
cial Code (U.C.C.) as amended in 1972). The interest created by an after-acquired property
agreement is commonly referred to as a "floating lien." For a comprehensive examination of
the floating lien, see Dugan, Cash-Sale Sellers Under Articles 2 and 9 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 8 U. C. C. L. J. 330, 330 n.1 (1975-76) [hereinafter cited as Dugan].
The U.S.A. can be found in 1 UNIF. LAWS ANN. 1-31 (1950).
"Bona fide purchaser" is a term of art and generally was defined under the common
law as a person who purchased an interest in property for a valuable consideration in good
faith and without notice of fraud or defect in the seller's title. United States v. California &
Ore. Land Co., 148 U.S. 31, 47 (1893); see Fargason v. Edrington, 49 Ark. 207, 4 S.W. 763,
764 (1887); Yale Oil Corp. v. Sedlacek, 99 Mont. 411, 43 P.2d 887, 889 (1935). Under the
common law, a mortgagee was a purchaser and was entitled to protection as a bona fide
purchaser against all interests of which the mortgagee had no notice. E.g., Fargason v.
Edrington, 49 Ark. 207, 4 S.W. 763, 764 (1887); Yale Oil Corp. v. Sedlacek, 99 Mont. 411, 43
P.2d 887, 889 (1935); see Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Pirie, 82 F. 799, 803 (8th Cir. 1897); Peck
v. Bartelme, 220 Ill. 199, 77 N.E. 216, 219 (1906). A lender could also qualify as a bona fide
purchaser. E.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Kay Bee Co., 366 Ill. 202, 7 N.E.2d 860, 861 (1937).
1 E.g., Barksdale v. Banks, 206 Ala. 569, 90 So. 913 (1921); Clark v. Hamilton Diamond
Co., 209 Cal. 1, 284 P. 915 (1930); Handley Motor Co. v. Wood, 237 N.C. 318, 75 S.E.2d 312
(1953); Johnson v. Iankovetz, 57 Ore. 24, 102 P. 799, 110 P. 398 (1910); Flatte v. Kossman
Buick Co., 265 S.W.2d 643 (Tex. Ct. App. 1954). See generally L. VOLD, LAW OF SALES § 30
(2d ed. 1959) [hereinafter cited as VOLD,]; S. WILLISTON, 2 WILLISTON ON SALES §§ 346a, 346b
(rev. ed. 1948) [hereinafter cited as WILLSTON]. Contra, Dugan, supra note 4, at 366-67
(little authority exists extending cash sale doctrine to subsequent good faith purchasers);
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and trustees in bankruptcy' ° of the buyer. Cash sales were governed by the
"cash sale doctrine."" Under this doctrine, a cash buyer did not receive
title to goods until the seller had been paid in full.' 2 A bona fide purchaser
of goods from a cash buyer did not obtain title to the goods because one
without title could not transfer title.'3 Thus, a bona fide purchaser's posses-
Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057, 1061 (1954)
[hereinafter cited as Gilmore] (cash sale doctrine rarely applied against good faith purchas-
ers in a commercial setting).
See, e.g., South San Francisco Packing & Provision Co. v. Jacobsen, 183 Cal. 131, 190
P. 628 (1920); Publicker Commercial Alcohol Co. v. Harger, 129 Conn. 655, 31 A.2d 27 (1943);
Laughlin Motors v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 173 Kan. 600, 251 P.2d 857 (1952).
9 See, e.g., Morehouse v. Keyport Auto Sales Co., 118 N.J. Eq. 368, 179 A. 279 (1935);
Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 150 Ore. 172, 43 P.2d 1078 (1935).
10 See, e.g., In re Perpall, 256 F. 758 (2d Cir. 1919); Engelkes v. Farmers Co-Operative
Co., 194 F. Supp. 319 (N.D. Iowa 1961); Morehouse v. Keyport Auto Sales Co., 118 N.J. Eq.
368, 179 A. 279 (1935).
" See generally Gilmore, supra note 7, at 1060-62. The cash sale doctrine was invoked
against good faith purchasers from a defaulting buyer, but the doctrine was not absolutely
or consistently applied. Many courts held that a cash seller was estopped from recovering his
goods from a subsequent good faith purchaser if the seller clothed the buyer with indicia of
ownership. E.g., Sullivan Co. v. Wells, 89 F. Supp. 317 (D. Neb. 1950); Bent v. Jerkins, 112
Ala. 485, 20 So. 655 (1896); Crescent Chevrolet Co. v. Lewis, 230 Iowa 1074, 300 N.W. 260
(1941); Gerber v. Pike, 249 S.W.2d 90 (Tex. Ct. App. 1952); see VOLD, supra note 7, at 174;
Corman, supra note 2, at 62-68. Courts also denied sellers the right to recover goods under
the rule that where one of two innocent persons must suffer loss by reason of the fraud or
deceit of another, the loss should fall on the one whose act or omission has enabled the wrong-
doer to commit the fraud. E.g., Hoham v. Aukerman-Tuesburg Motors, Inc., 77 Ind. App.
316, 133 N.E. 507 (1922); Russell Willis, Inc. v. Page, 213 S.C. 156, 48 S.E.2d 627 (1948); see
VOLD, supra note 7, at 177. This rule also served as the basis for the concept of voidable title.
See Shockley v. Hill, 91 Colo. 451, 15 P.2d 623 (1932); Neal, Clark & Neal Co. v. Tarby, 163
N.Y.S. 675, 99 Misc. 380 (1917); text accompanying note 23 infra.
The cash sale doctrine survived under § 73 of the U.S.A. as an omission in the Act.
Dugan, supra note 4, at 366 n.103; Gilmore, supra note 7, at 1060 n.10. Section 73 provided
that "[i]n any case not provided for in this act, the rules of law and equity, including the
law merchant. . . shall continue to apply. . . to sales of goods." U.S.A. § 73, 1 UNIF. LAWS
ANN. 29 (1950). Section 23 of the U.S.A. adopted the common law rules that one could not
transfer greater title than he possessed and that a buyer who had not paid for goods did not
acquire title to them. U.S.A. § 23, 1 UNIF. LAws ANN. 12 (1950); see text accompanying notes
12-13 infra. Thus, the cash sale doctrine survived implicitly by operation of U.S.A. §§ 23 and
73. The draftsmen of the U.C.C. apparently believed the cash sale doctrine was still law
because they abolished the doctrine with respect to subsequent good faith purchasers for
value. U.C.C. § 2-403(1)(b), (c); U.C.C. § 2-403, Comment 2; see text accompanying notes
27-30 & 36 infra.
,1 See, e.g., Harmon v. Goetter, 87 Ala. 325, 6 So. 93 (1889); Masoner v. Bell, 20 Okla.
618, 95 P. 239 (1908); Young v. Harris-Cortner Co., 152 Tenn. 15, 268 S.W. 125 (1924); see
Gilmore, supra note 7, at 1060-62; note 7 supra. See generally VOLD, supra note 7, at §§ 29-
30.
," A rule of law engendered by the maxim "nemo dat quod non habet" (he who hath not
cannot give) was used by the common law to protect sellers. E.g., Moore v. Long, 250 Ala.
47, 33 So.2d 6, 7 (1947); Kilgore v. State Bank of Colusa, 372 Ill. 578, 25 N.E.2d 39, 42 (1940);
Cooperider v. Myre, 37 Ohio App. 502, 175 N.E. 235, 236 (1930); see U.S.A. § 23, 1 UNIF. LAws
ANN. 12 (1950); Hawkland, Curing an Improper Tender of Title to Chattels: Past, Present
and Commercial Code, 46 MINN. L. REv. 697, 698 (1962).
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sion of the goods was adverse to the rights of the cash seller who still
retained title to the goods and could reclaim the goods from the pur-
chaser. 4 Sales governed by the cash sale doctrine resulted in inconvenience
and hardship for subsequent purchasers from a defaulting cash buyer. 5
More importantly, because goods could be recovered from good faith pur-
chasers, a seller's title to goods had to be fully documented before the sale
could occur free from subsequent interference from third parties. Conse-
quently, the cash sale doctrine restricted the free flow of goods in com-
merce. 6
At common law and under the USA, however, passage of title in credit
sales occurred at a different time than in cash sales." When a seller deliv-
ered goods to the buyer on credit, he transferred title to the goods." Be-
cause the credit buyer had title, the seller usually did not have a right to
reclaim the goods if the buyer defaulted in payment and the seller's only
remedy was an action for the price of the goods." Where the buyer fraudu-
" See notes 7-11 supra.
'5 Under the cash sale doctrine, when a subsequent purchaser obtained possession of
goods through a defaulting cash buyer and the buyer disappeared, the subsequent purchaser
had no remedy against the unpaid cash seller should the seller recover the goods. Even if the
buyer was available and solvent, the subsequent purchaser was inconvenienced by the loss
of goods. See generally VOLD, supra note 7, at § 30; Corman, supra note 2.
1" In many transactions, a seller could not prove he had title to goods where he obtained
the goods by check unless he had the cancelled check or the original seller's assurance that
the sale was final. A requirement that the seller have evidence of title before the subsequent
purchaser could be protected from the effects of the cash sale doctrine caused delay in transfer
of goods until the seller was able to obtain such evidence. Without an assurance that his seller
had title, the subsequent purchaser could lose his goods to the original seller. See text accom-
panying notes 6-14 supra. See generally VOLD, supra note 7, at § 30.
," See U.S.A. §§ 54 & 56, 1 UNiF. LAWS ANN. 21-22 (1950).
Is E.g., Jock v. O'Malley, 138 Minn. 388, 165 N.W. 233 (1917); see J. BENJAMIN, BENJAMIN
ON SALES §§ 796 & 799 (2d ed. 1887) [hereinafter cited as BENJAMIN]; 3 WILLISTON, supra note
7, §§ 506-16; Gilmore, supra note 7, at 1060; Note, The Owner's Intent and the Negotiability
of Chattels: A Critique of Section 2-403 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 72 YALE L. J. 1205,
1220 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Negotiability of Chattels]. An effectively functioning com-
mercial market is essential to the credit seller to assure that the occasional losses he suffers
when a buyer defaults are offset by a rapid turnover of merchandise. Rapid turnover is
encouraged if title is deemed to pass upon delivery because buyers do not incur the risk that
the goods will be reclaimed by the seller's wholesaler. The negotiability of goods in credit sales
thus enables a seller to cover the risk of buyer default because a cash flow will be created by
the high volume of sales. A cash seller, however, does not usually have a large turnover of
merchandise because he demands cash on delivery. The rapid turnover of goods is not neces-
sary to cover his risks because the case requirement has theoretically eliminated the risk of
buyer default. The low volume cash seller will thus be less able to withstand loss upon default
than the high volume credit seller. The cash seller does not intend to take the loss because
title does not pass until payment is made, but the credit seller is willing to pass title on
delivery without payment to further negotiability, thus the difference in protection against
the good faith purchaser. See Negotiability of Chattels, supra at 1220; cf. U.C.C. § 2-403(1)
(good faith purchaser protected against reclaiming seller, whether cash or credit).
"1 E.g., Jock v. O'Malley, 138 Minn. 388, 165 N.W. 233 (1917); see BENJAMIN, supra note
18, at §§ 796 & 799; 3 WILUSTON, supra note 7, at § 511; Dugan, supra note 4, at 366 n.103;
Gilmore, supra note 7, at 1060.
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lently induced the seller to deliver possession of the goods on credit how-
ever, the seller could reclaim the goods from the defaulting buyer, but,
unlike the cash sale transaction, could not reclaim the goods from a bona
fide purchaser from the buyer. 0 The fraudulent or defaulting credit buyer
thus obtained "voidable title"'" upon receipt of the goods.22 A buyer of
goods having voidable title has full legal title to the goods subject to the
right of the seller to avoid the title for fraud or nonpayment.2 The USA
codified the common law concept of voidable title.24 Thus, the credit buyer
could transfer title to another or use the goods as security2' until the seller
avoided the buyer's title.
The concept of voidable title was adopted in UCC section 2-403 and
applied to both cash and credit sales. Section 2-403 allows a purchaser with
voidable title to transfer good title to a "good faith purchaser for value." 27
21 E.g., O'Rieley v. Endicott-Johnson Corp., 297 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1961); California Con-
serving Co. v. D'Avanzo, 62 F.2d 528 (2d Cir. 1933); Manly v. Ohio Shoe Co., 25 F.2d 384
(4th Cir. 1928); In re Weissman, 19 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1927); see 3 WILLISTON, supra note 7, at
§ 511; Gilmore, supra note 7, at 1060; note 18 supra. The U.S.A. had no express provision
enabling an unpaid seller, cash or credit, to reclaim his goods from a defaulting buyer. The
common law rules thus controlled because rules of law and equity contolled where the U.S.A.
was silent on a subject. U.S.A. § 73, 1 UNIF. LAWS ANN. 29 (1950); see Weyerhaeuser Timber
Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 150 Ore. 172, 43 P.2d 1078 (1935); Petty v. Borg, 106 Utah 524, 150
P.2d 776 (1944); note 14 supra.
2! "Voidable title" is an intermediate position between good title and no title. If B
obtains possession of A's goods by fraud, but not by theft, though B has no right to retain
the goods against A, he has the power to transfer good title to a bona fide purchaser. Gilmore,
supra note 7, at 1059. Voidable title is premised on the proposition that, unlike theft, a seller
who is fraudulently induced to deliver possession of goods intends to transfer absolute owner-
ship and thus transfers voidable title along with possession. Corman, supra note 2, at 58; see
Pingleton v. Shepherd, 219 Ark. 473, 242 S.W.2d 971 (1951); Shockley v Hill, 91 Colo. 451,
15 P.2d 623 (1932); Nelson v. Lewis, 143 Kan. 175, 53 P.2d 813 (1936); Parr v. Helfrich, 108
Neb. 801, 189 N.W. 281 (1922). The seminal case on voidable title is Parker v. Patrick, 101
Eng. Rep. 99 (K.B. 1793).
2 Cf. text accompanying notes 6-14 supra (cash buyer received no title until seller re-
ceived full payment).
z 2 WILLISTON, supra note 7, at § 311; see notes 11, 21 supra. Factors' acts, enacted during
the nineteenth century, preceded the judicial acceptance of voidable title. The factors' acts
permitted a factor (agent) entrusted with goods for sale to pass good title to a bona fide
purchaser even though the factor sold the goods in breach of his authority. Gilmore, supra
note 7, at 1058. A bona fide purchaser received no title from a factor entrusted with goods
other than for the purpose of sale and the owner of the goods could recover them from the
bona fide purchaser. Negotiability of Chattels, supra note 18, at 1206. In effect, factors
entrusted with goods for sale held voidable title. See Gilmore, supra note 7, at 1058;
Negotiability of Chattels, supra note 18, at 1206. The U.S.A. expressly stated that factors'
acts were not affected by provisions of the U.S.A. U.S.A. § 23(2)(a), 1 UNIF. LAWS ANN. 12
(1950); see U.C.C. § 2-403(2), (3); U.C.C. § 2-403, Comment 1.
21 U.S.A. § 24, 1 UNIF. LAWS ANN. 12 (1950). The common law definition of bona fide
purchasr was codified in U.S.A. § 24 as well. Id.; see note 6 supra; note 122 infra.
E.g., Guckeen Farmers Elevator Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 269 Minn. 127, 130 N.W.2d 69
(1964); Ross v. Leuci, 194 Misc. 345, 85 N.Y.S.2d 497 (Civ. Ct. N. Y. 1949).
1, E.g., Baldwin v. Childs, 249 N.Y. 212, 163 N.E. 737 (1928).
7 U.C.C. § 2-403(1) provides:
A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or had power to
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A buyer who pays for goods by a check that is dishonored or who purchases
under an agreement that the transaction is a "cash sale" is given voidable
title.2 Section 2-403 thus gives voidable title to the cash buyer who would
not have had title under the common and pre-Code law. 29 The cash sale
doctrine, as formerly applied to subsequent purchasers, is abolished by
section 2-403 if the original seller has voluntarily parted with the goods.30
transfer except that a purchaser of a limited interest accuires rights only to the
extent of the interest purchased. A person with voidable title has power to transfer
a good title to a good faith purchaser for value. When goods have been delivered
under a transaction of purchase the purchaser has such power even though
(a) the transferor was deceived as to the identity of the purchaser,
or
(b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which is later disho-
nored, or
(c) it was agreed that the transaction was to be a "cash sale", or
(d) the delivery was procured through fraud punishable as larcenous
under the criminal law.
For a discussion of good faith under the U.C.C., see note 122 infra.
I U.C.C. § 2-403(1)(b), (c). Payment by check was commonly treated as a cash sale
under the pre-Code law. E.g., De Vries v. Sig. Ellingson & Co., 100 F. Supp. 781 (D. Minn.
1951); Parker v. First Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 299 N.C. 527, 50 S.E.2d 304 (1948). A
minority of jurisdictions held that a seller received voidable title when he paid by check, thus
treating payment by check as a credit transaction. E.g., Pingleton v. Shepherd, 219 Ark. 473,
242 S.W.2d 971 (1951); Nelson v. Lewis, 143 Kan. 175, 53 P.2d 813 (1936); Parr v. Helfrich,
108 Neb. 801, 189 N.W. 281 (1922). The majority of jurisdictions held, however, that title did
not pass to the buyer if he paid by a check that was subsequently dishonored because
payment by check is merely conditional with title remaining in the seller until the check is
honored. E.g., Johnson v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1953); Engstrom v. Benzel, 191
F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1951); South San Francisco Packing & Provision Co. v. Jacobsen, 183 Cal.
131, 190 P. 628 (1920); Publicker Commercial Alcohol Co. v. Harger, 129 Conn. 655, 31 A.2d
27 (1943); National Bank of Commerce v. Chicago, B. & N. R. R., 44 Minn. 224, 46 N.W.
342 (1890); see VOLD, supra note 7, at § 30; Corman, supra note 2, at 55; Note, The "Cash
Sale" Presumption in Bad Check Cases: Doctrinal and Policy Anomaly, 62 YALE L. J. 101
(1952); 33 B. U. L. REv. 417 (1953). Contra, 2 WILLISTON, supra note 7, at § 346a (payment
by check should give a buyer voidable title rather than no title until the check is paid).
Payment by check remains conditional, under U.C.C. § 2-511(3), but a buyer who pays by
check also receives voidable title and can transfer good title to a good faith purchaser for
value. U.C.C. § 2-403(1). The draftsmen of the U.C.C. clearly followed the prior law that
payment by check is a cash sale because they stated that a check post-dated by even one
day is a credit sale since the check is not given in payment. U.C.C. § 2-511, Comment 6.
21 In re Samuels & Co., 526 F.2d 1238, 1242 (5th Cir. 1976); see United States v. Wyoming
Nat'l Bank, 505 F.2d 1064, 1066-67 (10th Cir. 1974); Hollis v. Chamberlain, 243 Ark. 201, 419
S.W.2d 116, 118 (1967); text accompanying notes 6-14 supra.
o The old law of "cash sale" was abolished by § 2-403(1)(c). U.C.C. § 2-403, Comment
2; see-In re Samuels &'Co., 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1976); First Nat'l Bank v. Smoker, 153
Ind. App. 71, 286 N.E.2d 203 (1972); Evans Prods. Co. v. Jorgensen, 245 Ore. 362, 421 P.2d
978 (1966); U.C.C. § 2-403, Comment 1. "Purchase" is broadly defined as a "voluntary
transaction creating an interest in property." U.C.C. § 1-201(32). Thus under § 2-403(1), a
purchase is a transaction into which the seller-has voluntarily entered. Where goods are stolen
from the seller and resold to a good faith purchaser for value, the seller can still reclaim the
goods from the good faith purchaser because the initial transaction was not voluntarily
entered into by the seller. See Schrier v. Home Indem. Co., 273 A.2d 248 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971);
Linwood Harvestore, Inc. v. Cannon, 427 Pa. 434, 235 A.2d 377 (1967); Negotiability of
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Abolition of the cash sale doctrine with respect to subsequent purchasers
and the granting of voidable title to the buyer in cash sales by UCC section
2-403(1) have restricted the cash seller's right to recover his goods upon the
buyer's default in payment. Although UCC section 2-702(2) grants a credit
seller the right to reclaim goods from a defaulting buyer, the cash seller is
not expressly granted a right of reclamation.' Instead, this right has been
judicially created out of section 2-507(2) and an official comment to that
section.2 The majority of courts granting the cash seller a right of reclama-
tion have imposed a ten day limitation on execution of the cash seller's
right commencing upon delivery of the goods to the buyer.3 The cash
Chattels, supra note 18, at 1223-26. The cash sale doctrine has essentially been abolished with
respect to subsequent purchasers from a cash buyer, but the doctrine remains partially intact
between the cash seller and buyer. See VOLD, supra note 7, at § 30, pp. 181-82; cf. U.C.C. §
2-511(3) (payment by check conditional and defeated upon dishonor).
" See text accompanying notes 32-38 infra; compare U.C.C. § 2-707(2) with U.C.C. § 2-
507(2). U.C.C. § 2-707(2) provides:
Where the seller discovers that the buyer has received goods on credit while insol-
vent he may reclaim the goods upon demand made within ten days after the receipt,
but if misrepresentation of solvency has been made to the particular seller in writ-
ing within three months before delivery the ten day limitation does not apply.
Except as provided in this subsection the seller may not base a right to reclaim
goods on the buyer's fraudulent or innocent misrepresentation of solvency or of
intent to pay.
A credit seller may reclaim goods only if the buyer is insolvent at the time he receives the
goods. Thus the U.C.C. partially reflects the common law rule. See text accompanying note
20 supra. A credit seller's reclamation right must be exercised with ten days. U.C.C. § 2-
702(2). Where a third party purchases in good faith for value, a credit seller cannot success-
fully reclaim goods from him. U.C.C. §§ 2-403(1), 2-702(3).
12 U.C.C. § 2-507(2) states: "Where payment is due and demanded on the delivery to
the buyer of goods or documents of title, his right as against the seller to retain or dispose of
them is conditional upon his making the payment due." Comment 3 to U.C.C. § 2-507 adds:
Subsection (2) deals with the effect of a conditional delivery by the seller and
in such a situation makes the buyer's "right as against the seller" conditional upon
payment. These words are used as words of limitation to conform with the policy
set forth in the bona fide purchase sections of this Article [ § 2-403]. Should the
seller after making such a conditional delivery fail to follow up his rights, the
condition is waived. The provision of this Article for a ten day limit within which
the seller may reclaim goods delivered on credit to an insolvent buyer [ § 2-702(2)]
is also applicable here.
By timely exercise of the reclamation right, the seller "follows up" his rights and thus avoids
waiving the conditional nature of the buyer's payment. See text accompanying notes 62-66
infra. In re Mort Co., 208 F. Supp. 309 (E.D. Pa. 1962) is the seminal case constructing a
cash seller's right of reclamation out of § 2-507(2) and the official comment. The Mort court
read § 2-507(2) as unequivocally granting the cash seller a reclamation right because without
payment, the buyer has no right to retain the goods. 208 F. Supp. at 310; see U.C.C. § 2-
511(3).
3 In re Samuels & Co., 526 F.2d 1238, 1245 (5th Cir. 1976); In re Colacci's of America,
Inc., 490 F.2d 1118, 1120 (10th Cir. 1974); In re Richardson Homes Corp., 18 U.C.C. Rep. 384,
387 (N.D. Ind. 1975); In re Helms Veneer Corp., 287 F. Supp. 840, 846 (W.D. Va. 1968);
Stumbo v. Paul B. Hult Lumber Co., 251 Ore. 20, 444 P.2d 564, 571 (1968). Contra, In re
Lindenbaum's, Inc., 2 U.C.C. Rep. 495, 497 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (two weeks is reasonable time
for reclamation where payment was by check). For discussion of the ten day limit, see text
accompanying notes 62-67 infra.
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seller's common law right of reclamation has been significantly altered by
section 2-403(1). While under the prior law, a defaulting cash buyer had
no title and thus could not transfer title to third persons,34 section 2-403(1)
gives a defaulting cash buyer voidable title and the power to transfer good
title to a good faith purchaser for value.35 Thus under the UCC, a cash
seller cannot reclaim goods from a good faith pur.chaser for value who
purchases from the defaulting buyer. Consequently, the attempts by
some third persons to qualify as good faith purchasers for value under UCC
section 2-403(1) have resulted in controversy centering upon whether a
secured party with a floating lien37 on the cash buyer's inventory qualifies
as a good faith purchaser and can defeat a cash seller's right of reclama-
tion.3 1
A recent case exemplifying the priority conflict between the claims of
the cash seller and the secured party to goods upon the cash buyer's failure
to pay for the goods is In re Samuels & Co. 3 Samuels & Co, a meat packer,
had purchased cattle from various local ranchers paying for the cattle by
check 0 The transactions constituted cash sales.4 ' Samuels was financed
by C.I.T. Corporation42 which had a perfected lien on all of Samuels' inven-
tory including after-acquired property. 3 Before the sellers cashed their
checks, C.I.T. stopped financing Samuels thus prompting Samuels to file
31 See text accompanying notes 12-21 supra.
35 See text accompanying notes 27-30 supra.
1' Unlike the credit sale reclamation right granted by § 2-702(2), (3), the provisions of
the U.C.C. construed to grant the cash seller a right of reclamation do not expressly state
that the cash seller's right is subject to the rights of a good faith purchaser. Compare U.C.C.
§ 2-507(2) with U.C.C. § 2-702(3). Comment 3 to § 2-507 provides that good faith purchasers
have priority over cash sellers. U.C.C. § 2-507, Comment 3; see In re Samuels & Co., 526 F.2d
1238, 1244 (5th Cir. 1976).
3 See note 4 supra.
3 See note 3 supra. Often the third party contesting the seller's right of reclamation is a
secured party. Id. The secured party defeats the seller's reclamation petition in most cases
because the secured party qualifies as a good faith purchaser under U.C.C. § 2-403(1). See
cases cited in note 3 supra. The U.C.C. definition of purchase clearly includes a consensual
security interest. U.C.C. §§ 1-201(32); 1-201(37); see In re Samuels & Co., 526 F.2d 1238, 1243
(5th Cir. 1976); Kennedy, The Interest of a Reclaiming Seller Under Article 2 of the Code,
30 Bus. LAw. 833, 835 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Kennedy].
526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976).
0 526 F.2d at 1250-51 (Ainsworth, J., dissenting). Under the custom and usage of the
meat packing trade as codified by the Packers & Stockyards Act, 1921, 7 U.S.C. §§ 181-231
(1970), a meat packer does not pay for the cattle he purchases until after the animals have
been butchered and the carcasses chilled for a twenty-four hour period and graded by a
Department of Agriculture inspector. 526 F.2d at 1250 (Ainsworth, J., dissenting); see 9
C.F.R. § 201.99 (1977).
4, 526 F.2d at 1242; see note 28 supra.
,' 526 F.2d at 1242. At the time of the sellers' delivery of their cattle to Samuels, Samuels
was indebted to C.I.T. in excess of $1.8 million. Id.
,4 526 F.2d at 1242. C.I.T. had advanced large sums weekly to Samuels in the period
preceding the sellers' delivery of their cattle. C.I.T.'s lien on Samuels' after-acquired inven-
tory was perfected in 1963 and remained in effdct throughout the period of the sellers' delivery
of their cattle. Id.
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a Chapter XI petition for an arrangement under the Bankruptcy Act.44 The
checks were subsequently dishonored." The Fifth Circuit, in an en banc
opinion," held that C.I.T., as the holder of a perfected security interest in
the goods, prevailed over the sellers' reclamation rights which the court
characterized as unperfected purchase money security interests.'7 In addi-
tion, the court held that C.I.T. prevailed over the unpaid cash sellers'
reclamation claims because the corporation was a good faith purchaser for
value under UCC section 2-403(1). 5 The cash sellers were thus accorded
i 526 F.2d at 1251 (Ainsworth, J., dissenting); see 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-99 (1970). Two weeks
after Samuels filed for a Chapter XI arrangement, C.I.T. filed a petition with the bankruptcy
court to recover the assets and inventory of Samuels in effect claiming all of Samuels' assets
under C.I.T.'s perfected security interest. 526 F.2d at 1253 (Ainsworth, J., dissenting). The
cash sellers sought to reclaim the proceeds of the sale of the cattle then in the hands of the
bankruptcy trustee approximately one year after delivery and Samuels' filing for a Chapter
XI arrangement. Id. at 1245. The Fifth Circuit discussed the case as raising solely a relative
priority issue under the U.C.C. and essentially ignored the bankruptcy implications upon the
priority question.
1 Id. at 1251-52 (Ainsworth, J., dissenting).
16 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1976). The case was first heard by a bankruptcy referee who
awarded priority to the sellers over the claims of the trustee in bankruptcy and C.I.T. Id. at
1253, 1257 (Ainsworth, J., dissenting). The district court reversed, holding that C.I.T. was
entitled to the proceeds by virtue of its perfected security interest. Id. at 1238. The Fifth
Circuit, in a panel opinion, reversed the district court and held that the sellers had priority
over both C.I.T. and the bankruptcy trustee because the Packers & Stockyards Act, 1921, 7
U.S.C. §§ 181-231 (1970), imposed a fiduciary duty on Samuels to pay the sellers. 483 F.2d
557, 563 (5th Cir. 1973). Until Samuels' checks cleared the bank, the panel maintained that
Samuels was holding the slaughtered meat in trust for the sellers. Id. The Fifth Circuit panel
also held that U.C.C. § 2-403 was inapplicable because of the fiduciary duty imposed on
Samuels by the Packers & Stockyards Act. Id. The United States Supreme Court reversed
holding that no trust relationship is created by the Packers & Stockyards Act and that the
Act does not override provisions of the U.C.C. 416 U.S. 100, 105-14 (1974).
On remand, a Fifth Circuit panel again awarded priority to the sellers, holding that
C.I.T.'s security interest did not attach to the cattle, and that the ten day limitation on the
cash seller's exercise of the right of reclamation is not an absolute limitation. 510 F.2d 139,
147-48, 150-51 (5th Cir. 1975). The panel also held that C.I.T. did not qualify as a good faith
purchaser because C.I.T. had intimate knowledge of Samuels' business affairs and knew that
the corporation's decision to stop financing Samuels would result in dishonor of outstanding
checks. Id. at 151-52. Finally, the panel held that sellers' reclamation demands were prior to
the trustee in bankruptcy's lien. Id. at 152-53. On rehearing en banc, the Fifth Circuit
reversed the panel's previous decision and found that C.I.T. was entitled to priority over both
the sellers and the bankruptcy trustee. 526 F.2d 1238.
11 526 F.2d at 1248. A "purchase money security interest" is a security interest that is
"taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part of its price .. "U.C.C.
§ 9-107(a). A purchase money security interest is perfected when the interest has attached,
U.C.C. § 9-203(1), and a financing statement has been filed. U.C.C. §§ 9-302(1) & 9-303. A
perfected purchase money security interest in inventory has priority over a conflicing security
interest in the same inventory if the purchase money security interest is perfected at the time
the debtor receives possession of the inventory. U.C.C. § 9-312(3). In addition, the purchase
money secured party must give notice of his intent to the holder of a conflicting security
interest which was perfected previously in order to obtain priority. Id. The sellers in Samuels
could have prevailed over C.I.T.'s perfected security interest had they perfected a purchase
money security interest in the goods. 526 F.2d at 1244; see U.C.C. § 9-312(3).
1 526 F.2d at 1243-44.
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status as unsecured creditors of their cash buyer. 9 Finally, the court held
that C.I.T.'s security interest prevailed over the claim of the trustee in
bankruptcy to the proceeds of the sale of the cattle." Conversely, the
Samuels majority5' argued that the cash sellers' right of reclamation is not
a security interest and thus is not subject to the priority provisions of
Article 9.15 The minority also asserted that C.I.T.'s security interest did not
attach to the sellers' cattle because Samuels had insufficient rights in the
cattle to allow the interest to attach.0 Additionally, the minority stated
that the cash seller is not required to reclaim his goods within ten days of
delivery5 and contended that C.I.T. was not a good faith purchaser.5 The
minority concluded that as between the cash sellers and the secured party,
the sellers should have been awarded priority to the goods or proceeds of
their sale. 6 The minority also would have held that the sellers' reclamation
claims were superior to the claim of the trustee in bankruptcy.57
The Samuels court disagreed initially on the mechanics of reclamation,
the majority holding that the cash seller's reclamation right can only be
exercised within ten days of delivery of the goods to the buyer. 8 The
minority argued, however, that a ten day limit need not always control the
seller's reclamation demand. Most courts have restricted the judicially
49 Generally, the distribution of a bankrupt's assets to unsecured creditors is considera-
bly less than the creditor's claims. V. CoUNTRYMAN, CASES AND MATrEmALS ON DEBTOR AND
CREDITOR 264-65 (2d ed. 1974) (six to nine cents on the dollar).
10 526 F.2d at 1248.
51 The minority opinion in Samuels is essentially an abridged version of the earlier panel
decision reported at 510 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1975). See note 46 supra. In areas where the
minority opinion is unclear in its exposition of the minority's position as a result of the
abridgement, the earlier panel decision will be cited.
52 510 F.2d at 148-50; see text accompanying notes 92-97 infra.
510 F.2d at 150-51; see text accompanying notes 124-36 infra.
' 510 F.2d at 146-48; see text accompanying note 59 infra.
526 F.2d at 1254-57 (Ainsworth, J., dissenting); 510 F.2d at 151-52. The minority
asserted that C.I.T. was not a good faith purchaser because C.I.T. was so "intimately in-
volved" in Samuels' financial affairs that C.I.T. must have known when it refused additional
financing that outstanding checks issued to cattle sellers by Samuels would not be paid. 526
F.2d at 1256-57 (Ainsworth, J., dissenting); 510 F.2d at 152. Because C.I.T. was aware of the
outstanding claims of the unpaid cash sellers, the minority maintained C.I.T. could not
qualify as a good faith purchaser. 526 F.2d at 1257 (Ainsworth, J., dissenting); 510 F.2d at
152; see Dugan, supra note 4, at 352-63.
58 510 F.2d at 148, 151-52.
Id. at 152-53.
526 F.2d at 1245. The majority stated the ten day limitation was an "absolute require-
ment." Id.; see text accompanying note 33 supra.
11 510 F.2d at 146-48. The minority asserted that the purpose of the ten day limit is to
identify promptly the seller's claim to property in a bankrupt's estate and thus give notice
to other creditors who might extend credit to the bankrupt subsequent to the filing of the
bankruptcy petition on the basis of a misapprehension that the bankrupt possesses unencum-
bered assets. Id. at 147. C.I.T. filed a claim for essentially all of Samuels assets within two
weeks after Samuels filed for a Chapter XI arrangement, and the minority stated that C.I.T.'s
claim afforded potential creditors adequate notice and protection. Id. at 148. Thus, the
minority contended that the cash sellers should not have been required to comply with the
ten day limit. Id. The language of the U.C.C. reclamation provisions gives no indication that
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created right of a cash seller to reclaim goods"0 by imposing a ten day
limitation on the exercise of the right.6' The time limitation upon a cash
seller's exercise of the right of reclamation has its basis in the common law.
The cash seller's reclamation right at common law had to be exercised
"promptly" or the seller was held to have waived his right to reclaim the
goods thereby transforming the cash sale into a credit transaction. 2 The
right of reclamation can be waived under the UCC.13 The ten day limit
imposed under the construction courts have given UCC section 2-507(2) is
the ten day limit has any connection with bankruptcy and giving notice to creditors. See
U.C.C. §§ 2-507(2); 2-507, Comment 3; 2-702(2).
See text accompanying note 32 supra.
SI See cases cited in note 33 supra. Contra, In re Lindenbaum's, Inc., 2 U.C.C. Rep. 495
(E.D. Pa. 1964). The Lindenbaum court held that two weeks was a reasonable time within
which to deposit a check because the U.C.C. allows 30 days to initiate collection under § 3-
503(2)(a). The court thus allowed the seller's reclamation petition even though the ten day
limit was not observed. 2 U.C.C. Rep. at 497. The Lindenbaum court emphasized policy
reasons for protecting the cash seller and allowing the seller to reclaim the proceeds held by
the trustee in bankruptcy stating that "a businessman [seller] in financial difficulty must
be able to carry on cash transactions or go out of business altogether." Id., quoting In re Mort
Co., 208 F. Supp. 309, 311 (E.D. Pa. 1962). Lindenbaum is an anomaly in the case law.
62 Many courts at common law used the word "promptly," or a synonym, to indicate how
quickly the seller must take action in order to prevent waiver of his rights and be allowed to
reclaim his goods:
[T]he assertion of the right to reclaim the property must follow immediately upon
the buyer's default. This does not mean that the seller must [immediately] begin
legal proceedings to recover the goods; but it does mean that the seller, when he
discovers that his delivery is not followed by payment, . . . is at once put to his
election whether he will waive the condition as to payment and allow the delivery
to become absolute, or retake property, and that he is to allow no unnecessary delay
in making his choice. . . .He may not continue to hold his right to the goods, and
at the same time hold the buyer as his creditor. One or theother he must relinquish,
and do it promptly, or the law will forfeit his right to elect.
Frech v. Lewis, 218 Pa. 141, 67 A. 45, 46 (1907). "Promptly" proved an elusive concept for
the courts to define consistently. See VOLD, supra note 7, at § 29; 2 WILLISTON, supra note 7,
at § 346. Compare Sprague Canning Mach. Co. v. Fuller, 158 F. 588 (5th Cir. 1908) (21/2
months sufficiently prompt) with In re O'Callaghan, 225 F. 133 (D. Mass. 1914) (21 days not
prompt) and Hirsch Lumber Co. v. Hubbell, 143 App. Div. 317, 128 N.Y.S. 85 (1911) (30 days
not prompt).
Under the U.C.C., "promptly" is implicitly defined as within ten days of delivery to the
buyer. See U.C.C. §§ 2-507, Comment 3; 2-702(2). If payment is made by check, the seller is
given 30 days after the date the check was drawn or issued, whichever is later, to present the
check for payment, U.C.C. § 3-503(2)(a), but must reclaim his goods within ten days of
delivery or face waiver of the reclamation right. U.C.C. § 2-507, Comment 3. Evidently, the
draftsmen of Article 2 of the U.C.C. decided that the seller should bear the burden in cash
transactions.
6 U.C.C. § 2-507, Comment 3; see note 32 supra. One court has construed the require-
ment of a "follow up" by the seller expressed in comment 3 to mean a regaining of possession
or a bona fide attempt to do so. In re Colacci's of America, Inc., 490 F.2d 1118, 1121 (10th
Cir. 1974). Prior to the adoption of the U.C.C., several courts held that a seller's sending bills
and seeking payment amounted to an extension of credit because these are not prompt
attempts to reclaim the goods. See, e.g., H. K. Porter Co. v. Boyd, 171 F. 305 (3d Cir. 1909);
Hirsch Lumber Co. v. Hubbell, 143 App. Div. 317, 128 N.Y.S. 85 (1911); Frech v. Lewis, 218
Pa. 141, 67 A. 45 (1907).
[Vol. XXXV
RECLAMATION PRIORITIES
an arbitrary determination of the common law requirement of prompt-
ness." Thus, goods can be reclaimed by the seller from the buyer only
within ten days following delivery, but the defaulting buyer will remain
liable to the unpaid seller beyond the ten day period for breach of the sales
contract 5 or for dishonor of the buyer's check.6 While such a limit may
cause hardship in certain situations, 7 the ten day limit provides an ele-
ment of certainty for both the buyer and seller that was lacking under the
prior law.
Although a cash seller can reclaim goods from a buyer within ten days
of delivery, the seller cannot reclaim goods from a good faith purchaser for
value who purchased from the buyer." Thus, the cash seller's right of
reclamation may be exercised only against the buyer or a party who does
not qualify as a good faith purchaser for value." Courts have consistently
held that secured parties holding floating liens on buyers' inventories are
purchasers for value under the UCC.7 1 Consequently, if a secured party has
acted in good faith, he can defeat the reclamation petition of a seller.7'
Moreover, secured parties can qualify as good faith purchasers for value
"unconsciously" 72 because they are not required to give new value contem-
6, Cf. Stone v. Perry, 60 Me. 48 (1872) (cash sale; ten days given to make payment as a
courtesy under custom and usage of flour trade; no waiver).
U.C.C. § 2-709; see U.C.C. § 3-802(1)(b).
68 U.C.C. § 3-802(I)(b).
87 When a seller deposits the buyer's check in his account before the ten day limit has
run and is not notified of the check's dishonor until after the ten days have run, the seller
loses his right of reclamation and may not be able to recover the price from the buyer because
of the buyer's insolvency or bankruptcy. See In re Samuels & Co., 526 F.2d at 1248 (Gee, J.,
concurring).
68 In re Samuels & Co., 526 F.2d at 1242; In re Hayward Woolen Co., 3 U.C.C. Rep. 1107,
1111 (D. Mass. 1967); see United States v. Wyoming Nat'l Bank, 505 F.2d 1064, 1067-68 (10th
Cir. 1974); Stumbo v. Paul B. Hult Lumber Co., 251 Ore. 20, 444 P.2d 564, 571 n.10 (1968);
U.C.C. § 2-507, Comment 3.
" See U.C.C. §§ 2-403(1); 2-507, Comment 3; cf. U.C.C. § 2-702(2), (3) (credit seller's
right of reclamation). The holder of a floating lien as security for financing gives value under
U.C.C. § 1-201(44) sufficient to satisfy the value requirement of U.C.C. § 2-403(1). First-
Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Academic Archives, Inc., 10 N.C. App. 619, 179 S.E.2d 850,
853 (1971). The seller's inability to reclaim his goods from good faith purchasers is contrary
to the result reached under the pre-Code law. See text accompanying notes 6-14 supra.
,0 In re Samuels & Co., 526 F.2d at 1242; United States v. Wyoming Nat'l Bank, 505 F.2d
1064, 1067 (10th Cir. 1974); In re Hayward Woolen Co., 3 U.C.C. Rep. 1107, 1111 (D. Mass.
1967); First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Academic Archives, Inc., 10 N.C. App. 619, 179
S.E.2d 850, 853 (1971); Stumbo v. Paul B. Hult Lumber Co., 251 Ore. 20, 444 P.2d 564, 571
n.10 (1968).
" When the secured party's interest attaches to specific inventory, the secured party is
a good faith purchaser for value of that property and can defeat the reclamation claim of the
seller. See cases cited in note 70 supra. The secured party cannot qualify as a good faith
purchaser for value if his security interest does not attach to the buyer's inventory. See U.C.C.
§ 1-201(32), (33), (37); note 131 infra. Thus, the question of whether a secured party's interest
attached to goods in the buyer's possession which the buyer had paid for by a worthless check
is crucial to the success or failure of the seller's reclamation petition. For a discussion of the
attachment of a security interest, see text accompanying notes 122-34 infra.
"' The "unconscious purchaser" is a holder of a floating lien who has made no recent
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poraneous with the buyer's acquisition of the goods 3
The Samuels court futher limited the seller's right of reclamation by
holding that the reclamation right entitles a seller only to goods and not
proceeds, asserting that neither the credit seller nor the cash seller is ex-
pressly granted a right to recover proceeds under the UCC and that where
a right to proceeds is allowed, the right is expressly recognized by the
advances and may not know of goods the buyer has added to his inventory, but whose security
interest automatically attaches to goods when they are acquired by the buyer. See United
States v. Wyoming Nat'l Bank, 505 F.2d 1064, 1067-68 (10th Cir. 1974); First-Citizens Bank
& Trust Co. v. Academic Archives, Inc., 10 N.C. App. 619, 179 S.E.2d 850, 853 (1971);
Countryman, Buyers and Sellers of Goods in Bankruptcy, 1 N. M. L. Rav. 435, 458 n.119
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Countryman].
71 See U.C.C. § 9-108; U.C.C. § 9-204(1). Several commentators have expressed dissatis-
faction with courts indiscriminately according the holder of a floating lien status as a good
faith purchaser for value. Anderson, The Reclaiming Seller Under UCC Section 2-702 vs. His
Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse, 8 ST. MARY's L. J. 271, 280-82 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as Anderson]; Countryman, supra note 72, at 458 n.119. These commentators would prefer
that the floating lienor be required to make a concurrent advance of new value before his
interest can attach to the newly purchased goods. The "unconscious purchaser" then could
not prevail over the "real" claim of the reclaiming seller. Anderson, supra; Countryman,
supra; see U.C.C. § 9-108, Comment 2. These commentators do not define what constitutes
a concurrent advance allowing the attachment of the floating lien to the goods. The U.C.C.
definition of value states that an antecedent debt constitutes value, U.C.C. § 1-201(44)(b),
and the good faith purchaser section does not require the giving of new value. U.C.C. § 2-
403(1). The critics' suggested requirement of new value is not mandated by the U.C.C. See
U.C.C. § 9-108; text accompanying notes 143-46 infra; cf. U.C.C. § 9-204(2) (after-acquired
property clause does not attach to consumer goods unless the secured party has given value
within ten days of the debtor's receipt of the goods).
An interesting variation in the case law concerning the floating lienor's priority over the
unpaid cash seller to goods in the defaulting buyer's possession is the holding of International
Harvestor Credit Corp. v. American Nat'l Bank, 296 So.2d 32 (Fla. 1974). In International
Harvester, the court concluded that the priority protection of the perfected floating lien must
be limited to the portion of the floating lienor's claim that equals the value of the buyer's
equity in the after-acquired property. Id. at 35; accord, Whitworth v. Krueger, 98 Idaho 65,
558 P.2d 1026, 1044-47 (1976) (Bistline, J., dissenting). The court stated that "upon principles
of equity and in the avoidance of unjust enrichment, the limitation to the debtor's [buyer's]
equity in after-acquired property [is] the better and more logical rule." International Har-
vester Credit Corp. v. American Nat'l Bank, 296 So.2d at 34. A seller's claim of unjust
enrichment is actually a claim of unjust deprivation because the buyer is clearly indebted to
both the secured party and the seller. See In re Samuels & Co., 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1976)
(buyer owed in excess of $1.8 million to the secured party and approximately $50,000 to the
sellers). The International Harvester court indicated, however, that a seller might not be
protected where the secured party had given new value. 296 So.2d at 34-35. Under
International Harvester, the unpaid seller is thus protected from the hardship of the attach-
ment of an after-acquired property clause to goods before he can reclaim them. See text
accompanying notes 146-49 infra.
" 526 F.2d at 1245. The question whether proceeds could be reclaimed arose in the
Samuels case because the trustee in bankruptcy had sold the meat. The meat would have
deteriorated during the pendency of the Chapter XI arrangement and subsequent actions
brought by C.I.T. and the sellers to recover the goods or proceeds. The minority did not
question the propriety of allowing a seller to reclaim proceeds in such a case. 510 F.2d at 144;
see note 51 supra.
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UCC.11 Despite the Samuels majority's denial of proceeds to the seller
seeking reclamation, several courts have allowed the reclamation of pro-
ceeds as an acceptable substitute for the goods where the goods are no
longer available." Under the pre-Code law, proceeds were recoverable as a
matter of course when goods were unavailable." Section 1-103 of the UCC
states that the prior law has not been altered except to the extent that the
prior law has been displaced by specific provisions of the UCC.8 Since the
UCC reclamation provisions do not explicitly prohibit the reclamation of
proceeds and the prior law allowed such recovery, the UCC implicitly
allows the recovery of proceeds when the goods are no longer available and
the proceeds of the sale of the goods are identified as such."
The Samuels majority and the minority differed on the basic question
of whether the cash seller's right of reclamation could be characterized as
a security interest."0 This characterization depends upon whether courts
define the right as a reservation of title' or as a method of rescinding a
transaction."2 The majority held that the cash seller's reclamation right
acts as a reservation of title,"3 asserting that payment by check represents
a payment conditioning transfer of title on the check being honored upon
presentment. 4 Under this analysis, the payment by check creates an osten-
sible reservation of title in the seller pending payment of the check." Such
" 526 F.2d at 1245. Compare U.C.C. § 9-306 with § 2-507(2) and § 2-702(2).
7' In re Lindenbaum's, Inc., 2 U.C.C. Rep. 495, 497 (E.D. Pa. 1964); Ranchers & Farmers
Livestock Auction Co. v. Honey, 552 P.2d 313, 317 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976); Greater Louisville
Auto Auction, Inc. v. Ogle Buick, Inc., 387 S.W.2d 17, 20-21 (Ky. Ct. App. 1965). No cases
prior or subsequent to Samuels have denied the seller the right to recover proceeds.
n E.g., South San Francisco Packing & Provision Co. v. Jacobsen, 183 Cal. 131, 190 P.
628, 630 (1920); Laughlin Motors v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 173 Kan. 600, 251 P.2d
857, 858, 865 (1952); Johnson-Brinkham Co. v. Central Bank, 116 Mo. 558, 22 S.W. 813, 815
(1893); Morehouse v. Keyport Auto Sales Co., 118 N.J. Eq. 368, 179 A. 279, 281 (1935);
Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 150 Ore. 172, 43 P.2d 1078, 1087 (1935).
11 U.C.C. § 1-103; U.C.C. § 1-103, Comment 1.
19 The recovery of proceeds should not be allowed if such a recovery would violate any of
the express provisions of the reclamation sections. See U.C.C. §§ 2-507(2); 2-507, Comment
3; 2-702(2), (3). If the proceeds are clearly identified as the proceeds of the sale of the goods,
the seller should be able to reclaim them. Cf. § 9-306(1) (proceeds refer to what is received
from the sale of goods and are thus identified).
" Compare 526 F.2d at 1246-47 with 526 F.2d at 1253-54 (Ainsworth, J., dissenting).
Whether the right of reclamation is a security interest governed by the provisions of Article
9 has sparked considerable commentary. See Anderson, supra note 73, at 295-97; Braucher,
Reclamation of Goods From a Fraudulent Buyer, 65 MIcH. L. REv. 1281, 1290 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Braucher]; Dugan, supra note 4, at 342-45; Kennedy, supra note 38, at
836-39. Compare Guy Martin Buick, Inc. v. Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank, 184 Colo. 166, 519
P.2d 354 (1974) (right of reclamation not a security interest) with In re Samuels & Co., 526
F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1976) (right of reclamation is a security interest).
, See U.C.C. § 2-401(1); text accompanying notes 84-87 infra.
See Guy Martin Buick, Inc. v. Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank, 184 Colo. 166, 519 P.2d
354, 359 (1974).
526 F.2d at 1246-47; see U.C.C. § 2-401(1); note 86 infra.
1 526 F.2d at 1246; see U.C.C. § 2-511(3).
8 The majority's position that a seller reserves title when he accepts the buyer's check
in payment until the check is honored is analogous to the cash sale doctrine under which title
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a reservation of title is arguably a security interest under UCC section 2-
401(1) which states that any reservation or retention of title under Article
2 is a security interest.86 The majority concluded that reclamation based
on the conditional nature of payment by check is thus a security interest
under UCC section 2-401(1).87 The seller's security interest was held by the
Samuels majority to be governed by Article 9 as an unperfected purchase
money security interest and therefore was subordinated to C.I.T.'s per-
fected floating lien."
The Samuels minority, however, argued that UCC section 2-401(1) only
applies to credit transactions.89 The minority contended that in the actual
did not pass to the buyer until the check was honored. See note 28 supra. Since title retention
creates a security interest under U.C.C. § 2-401(1), the seller is deemed to have a security
interest pending payment of the check. See U.C.C. § 2-401(1).
11 526 F.2d at 1246-47; see text accompanying note 89 infra. U.C.C. § 2-401(1) states:
Any retention or reservation by the seller of the title(property) in goods shipped or
delivered to the buyer is limited in effect to a reservation of a security interest.
Subject to these provisions and to the provisions of the Article on Secured Transac-
tions (Article 9), title to goods passes from the seller to the buyer in any manner
and on any conditions explicitly agreed on by the parties.
Whether or not a cash seller has retained or reserved any title in the goods is the central issue
in determining whether the right of reclamation is also a security interest. See text accompa-
nying notes 87-121 infra.
The Samuels majority cited four cases as applying § 2-401(1) to cash sales. 526 F.2d at
1246. Three of the four, however, do not support the court's contention that the section applies
equally to cash and credit transactions. The Samuels court first cites the appellate decision
in Guy Martin Buick, Inc. v. Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank, 32 Colo. App. 235, 511 P.2d 912
(1973), but the Colorado Supreme Court subsequently held that a cash seller's reclamation
right was not a security interest. Guy Martin Buick, Inc. v. Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank,
184 Colo. 166, 519 P.2d 354, 359 (1974); see text accompanying notes 98-104 infra. In English
v. Ford, 17 Cal. App.3d 1038, 95 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1971), the California court held that a
reclaiming cash seller did not have a security interest in the goods because the seller had not
reserved or retained any title in the goods. Id. at 1047, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 506. Evidently, the
California court believed a reclaiming cash seller could have a security interest, but held that
the interest did not arise solely by the operation of § 2-401 and the right of reclamation. In
Evans Prods. Co. v. Jorgensen, 245 Ore. 362, 421 P.2d 978 (1966), the Oregon Supreme Court
noted that in order for a seller to have a security interest in the goods delivered, he must create
the interest. Id. at 981. The security interest does not arise solely by applying § 2-401(1) to a
cash sale. Id. The final case the majority cites as applying § 2-401 to cash sales is First Nat'l
Bank v. Smoker, 153 Ind. App. 71, 286 N.E.2d 203 (1972). Smoker supports the majority's
view that U.C.C. § 2-401(1) characterizes the reclamation right of a cash seller as a security
interest.
See note 86 supra
526 F.2d at 1246-48; accord, United States v. Wyoming Nat'l Bank, 505 F.2d 1064, 1068
(10th Cir. 1974); First Nat'l Bank v. Smoker, 153 Ind. App. 71, 286 N.E.2d 203, 211 (1972);
cf. Evans Prods. Co. v. Jorgensen, 245 Ore. 362, 421 P.2d 978, 981 (1966) (reclaiming seller
can create a security interest but the interest does not arise automatically from the reclama-
tion right and § 2-402(1)).
11 526 F.2d at 1253-54 (Ainsworth, J., dissenting); see note 91 infra. The majority stated
that U.C.C. § 2-401(1) would merely be definitional if the section only applied to credit
transactions since a credit sale is defined as a sale in which the seller reserves a security
interest. 526 F.2d at 1246. According to the majority, § 2-401(1) operates upon any reservation
of title whether the transaction be cash or credit. 526 F.2d at 1246-47. The majority discounts
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course of dealing a cash seller does not retain or reserve title with the
intention of creating a security interest. 0 The cash seller reasonably be-
lieves the buyer's performance has been completed and the sale finalized
when he accepts the buyer's check.9 The UCC allows a cash seller to
perfect a purchase money security interest," but because the seller believes
he has received full payment for the goods upon receiving the check, he
probably would not take the steps necessary to perfect.93 Moreover, the
definitions of a purchase money security interest and a cash sale contradict
each other. A cash seller who has received full payment for his goods in
the form of a check will not seek to secure all or part of the price charged
for the goods since he deems such protection unnecessary.94 Where a seller
takes the buyer's check in payment for goods, there is neither a reservation
of title by the seller15 nor an obligation to be secured. 9 The cash seller's
the minority's argument that § 2-401(1) does not apply to cash sales because a cash seller
does not reserve title when he delivers possession to the buyer. Id. A cash sale, however, does
not fit within § 2-401(1) because there is no title retention. Thus, § 2-401(1) cannot operate
upon a cash sale absent an express agreement between the parties inserting title retention in
the sales terms. See U.C.C. § 2-401(2); Dugan, supra note 4, at 343-44.
11 526 F.2d at 1253-54 (Ainsworth, J., dissenting). Title passes to a buyer when he re-
ceives goods in return for his check, U.C.C. § 2-401(2), but the title is subject to divestment
by the seller should the check be dishonored. U.C.C. § 2-511(3). The cash seller is not entitled
to reclaim the goods because he retained title, but because of protection offered by U.C.C.
§§ 2-507(2) and 2-511(3). See Dugan, supra note 4, at 344; note 89 supra. The subject of title
retention under the U.C.C. is more closely allied with credit transactions such as conditional
sales than with cash sales, see notes 89 supra & 91 infra; yet courts and commentators have
stated that a credit seller does not intend to create or retain a security interest without an
agreement to that effect, and U.C.C. § 2-702(2) does not automatically give the seller a
security interest in the case where he has delivered goods on credit to an insolvent buyer. In
re Mel Golde Shoes, Inc., 403 F.2d 658, 660 (6th Cir. 1968); Ranchers & Farmers Livestock
Auction Co. v. First State Bank, 531 S.W.2d 167, 169 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975); 3A R. DuESEN-
BERG & L. KING, SALES & BULK TRANSFERS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 13.03 [4]
(1966) [hereinafter cited as DUESENBERO & KING].
01 The Samuels minority reasoned that "[b]ecause the limited time sequence, extending
from the receipt of the check to its being cashed, is so short, it would be unreasonable to
require the cash seller to follow the litany of the Code and take measures to perfect an alleged
security interest." 526 F.2d at 1254 (Ainsworth, J., dissenting). Contra, id. at 1248-49 (Gee,
J., concurring) (purchase money protection reasonable and feasible for cash seller).
92 The Samuels majority held that a cash seller should perfect a purchase money security
interest in order to protect his interest in the goods. 526 F.2d at 1244; see Evans Prods. Co.
v. Jorgensen, 245 Ore. 362, 421 P.2d 978 (1966); U.C.C. §§ 9-107; 9-302; 9-303.
'3 See text accompanying note 91 supra.
"1 See text accompanying notes 91-93 supra. Demanding full payment upon delivery is
not purchase money financing. The purchase money financier is a seller who sells goods on
credit effectively making a loan which is secured by the purchase money security interest. J.
WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL' CODE § 25-5,
at 914 (1972) [hereinafter cited as WHrrE & SUMMERS]; see U.C.C. § 9-107.
'" See text accompanying notes 90-94 supra.
H6 See U.C.C. § 3-802(1)(b). Section 3-802(1)(b) provides that where a check is taken in
payment for an underlying obligation, such as the obligation to pay on a sales contract, the
obligation is suspended pro tanto until presentment of the check. Payment by check is
conditional payment. U.C.C. § 2-511(3); see U.C.C. § 2-507(2). By taking a check in payment,
the seller surrenders the right to sue on the obligation; but if the check is dishonored on due
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right of reclamation is not an interest in property that secures payment or
performance of an obligation, an Article 9 security interest, or a reservation
of title by the seller, but is a limited remedy provided solely to a seller to
rescind a transaction that has failed and to reclaim goods because the
buyer has defaulted in payment.
The characterization of the reclamation right as a security interest can
be determinative of priority in a conflict between a seller and a secured
party for possession of the goods. Under the UCC, a party with a perfected
floating lien prevails over a reclaiming cash seller regardless of how the
seller's interest is characterized, provided the secured party qualifies as a
good faith purchaser for value and the seller has not perfected a purchase
money security interest.7 Where the secured party does not perfect his
security interest, the secured party's ability to prevail over the reclaiming
seller for priority to the goods is uncertain. In Guy Martin Buick, Inc. v.
Colorado Springs National Bank, 8 the cash seller argued that he had a
security interest through his right of reclamation and that he had perfected
his interest by repossessing the goods after dishonor of the buyer's check.9
The secured party, a bank, held an unperfected security interest in the
goods.9 9 Had the Guy Martin court characterized the seller's reclamation
right as a security interest, the seller would have prevailed over the secured
party because the seller's interest would have been perfected. 10 Instead,
the court awarded the goods to the secured party and held that reclamation
constitutes a right to rescind a transaction rather than a right which se-
cures payment. 10 2 In addition, the court stated that successful reclamation
presentment, the right to sue on the obligation is revived. U.C.C. § 3-802, Comment 3. If the
check is dishonored, the seller can then elect to sue on the instrument or on the underlying
obligation, U.C.C. §§ 3-802(1)(b); 3-802, Comment 3, or try to reclaim the goods. U.C.C. §
2-507(2). Thus, there is no obligation to be secured after a check is received in payment since
the buyer has satisfied his obligation pending presentment. The seller reasonably believes he
has received full payment. See text accompanying notes 90-94 supra.
'7 If the seller's right of reclamation is characterized as an unperfected security interest
governed by Article 9 provisions the seller will not have priority over the perfected interest of
a secured party because "[clonflicting security interests rank according to priority in time
of filing or perfection." U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a); see In re Samuels & Co., 526 F.2d at 1248;
United States v. Wyoming Nat'l Bank, 505 F.2d 1064, 1068 (10th Cir. 1974); First Nat'l Bank
v. Smoker, 153 Ind. App. 71, 286 N.E.2d 203, 214 (1972); Evans Prods. Co. v. Jorgensen, 245
Ore. 362, 421 P.2d 978, 981 (1966). If reclamation is instead construed strictly as an Article 2
right, a good faith purchaser will prevail over the reclaiming seller. See text accompanying
notes 34-38 supra. Secured parties can qualify as good faith purchasers. See text accompany-
ing notes 68-73 supra. For discussion of whether a secured party can qualify as a good faith
purchaser if the secured party's interest has not attached to the goods, see text accompanying
notes 122-34 infra.
" 184 Colo. 166, 519 P.2d 354 (1974).
" Id. at 359. U.C.C. § 9-305 states that '1a] security interest . . . in goods ...may
be perfected by the secured party's taking possession of the collateral. . .A security interest
is perfected by possession from the time possession is taken without relation back and contin-
ues only so long as possession is retained .... " See also U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(a).
"1 519 P.2d at 359.
10' U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a); see text accompanying note 97 supra.
102 519 P.2d at 359; see notes 86 & 90 supra.
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excludes all other remedies, and that characterizing the right of reclama-
tion as a security interest might allow a recovery greater than reclamation
of the goods."°3 The court futher reasoned that UCC section 9-301 does not
require a secured party to perfect his security interest in order to prevail
over,a reclaiming seller. 104 Because a cash seller's right of reclamation is
not a security interest, the holder of an unperfected security interest has
priority over the seller for the right to possession of the goods.0 5 If, however,
the seller was deemed to have an unperfected purchase money security
interest,06 the seller would prevail over the secured party who holds an
unperfected security interest if the seller's security interest attached to the
goods first.10 The success of a seller's reclamation attempt when the at-
tempt conflicts with the rights of a secured party is thus largley dependent
on how courts characterize the reclamation right.
Despite mainatining that the right of reclamation is not a security
interest, the Samuels minority asserted that if the right is a security inter-
est, the right would not be governed by Article 9 which generally applies
to security interests created by an express agreement between debtor and
secured party. ' Since the right to reclaim is a nonconsensual interest
created by Article 2,10 the right would not be controlled by the provisions
of Article 9 unless section 9-113 applies.'0 Under section 9-113, where the
519 P.2d at 359; see U.C.C. § 2-702(3).
I" 519 P.2d at 359. U.C.C. § 9-301 lists the persons who take priority over unperfected
security interests. Since a reclaiming seller is not listed as a person entitled to priority over
an unperfected security interest, the court concluded that a reclaiming seller's rights are
subordinate to the rights of a holder of an unperfected security interest. Id.; see U.C.C. § 9-
301; Anderson, supra note 73, at 296; Kennedy, supra note 38, at 838.
'0 See text accompanying note 104 supra. The secured party could also claim status as
a good faith purchaser for value and prevail. See text accompanying notes 34-38 & 68-73
supra..
106 See In re Samuels & Co., 526 F.2d at 1246-48; note 88 supra.
'0 When unperfected security interests conflict, the first to attach to the disputed goods
has priority. U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(b). If the seller's right of reclamation is held to be a security
interest because he has retained title and created a security interest by operation of U.C.C.
§ 2-401(1), the seller will receive priority at least equal to that of the secured party holding
an unperfected interest. Both interests arise when the debtor attains rights in the property
under U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(c). No court has faced the issue of which party's security interest
attaches first, but conceptually the seller's security interest would attach first because the
rights sufficient to allow attachment flow from the seller to the buyer. See generally WHrrz
& SUMMERS, supra note 94, § 23-4, at 794 & n.26.
"1 526 F.2d at 1254 (Ainsworth, J., dissenting); see Guy Martin Buick, Inc. v. Colorado
Springs Nat'l Bank, 184 Colo. 166, 519 P.2d at 359; U.C.C. § 9-102; U.C.C. § 9-102, Comment
"Purposes." The minority in Samuels is not entirely correct when it says no security interest
arising from the right of reclamation can be governed by Article 9. The seller automatically
has a perfected security interest fully protected by Article 9 where the buyer does not have
possession or has not lawfully obtained possession of the goods. See U.C.C. § 9-113; text
accompanying notes 111-14 infra.
100 See U.C.C. §§ 2-507(2); 2-511(3); 2-702; 9-113, Comment 2; Kennedy, supra note 38,
at 835.
11 Section 9-113 provides:
A security interest arising solely under the Article on Sales (Article 2) is subject
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buyer does not have possession or does not lawfully obtain possession of
the goods, the seller automatically has a perfected security interest without
complying with the Article 9 requisites for creation or perfection of a secu-
rity interest."' A buyer who pays for goods with a check he knows will be
dishonored or takes goods on credit while insolvent has voidable title to the
goods," 2 but arguably has not lawfully obtained possession of the goods."
3
The seller thus has a perfected security interest in the goods and is pro-
tected by the priority provisions of section 9-312."' Under section 9-113, if
the buyer has lawfully obtained possession of the goods,"' the seller must
comply with the requirements of Article 9 before he can bring his claimed
security interest within the scope of Article 9.116 A written security agree-
to the provisions of this Article except that to the extent that and so long as the
debtor does not have or does not lawfully obtain possession of the goods
(a) no security agreement is necessary to make the security interest
enforceable; and
(b) no filing is required to perfect the security interest; and
(c) the rights of the secured party on default by the debtor are gov-
erned by the Article on Sales (Article 2).
The right of reclamation has been found to be controlled by § 9-113. In re Samuels & Co.,
526 F.2d at 1247. Other courts have implicitly applied § 9-113 to the right of reclamation by
stating the right is an unperfected purchase money security interest, an Article 9 interest.
See Anderson, supra note 73, at 296-97; Kennedy, supra note 38, at 838; cases cited in note
88 supra.
I U.C.C. § 9-113. The seller is not required to obtain a written security agreement signed
by the buyer or to file a financing statement to perfect where the buyer does not have
possession or does not lawfully obtain possession of the goods. U.C.C. § 9-113.
112 U.C.C. § 2-403(1)(b), (d).
" Anderson, supra note 73, at 297; Dugan, supra note 4, at 344 n.43; see, e.g., U.C.C. §
2-702, Comment 2 ("[A]ny receipt of goods on credit by an insolvent buyer amounts to a
tacit business misrepresentation of solvency and therefore is fraudulent as against the partic-
ular seller."); MNN. STAT. § 609.535 (bad check statute): "Whoever issues any check...
for the payment of money which, at the time of issuance, he intends shall not be paid may
be sentenced to imprisonment . . . or to payment of a fine .... "
"' See U.C.C. § 9-312(5). U.C.C. section 9-113(c) provides that the rights of the secured
creditor of a defaulting debtor are governed by Article 2. Under Article 2 and the judicially
created right of reclamation, the seller must reclaim his goods within ten days of delivery or
else the remedy is waived. See text accompanying notes 58-67 supra. If, upon default, the
seller-secured party seeks to reclaim his goods, section 9-113(c) requires him to utilize the
Article 2 remedies rather than the provisions of Article 9 on default. See Article 9, part 5 of
the U.C.C. Regardless of the existence of a security interest, the reclamation right of Article
2 is limited to ten days from delivery. Cf. Anderson, supra note 73, at 297 n.135 (credit seller's
right of reclamation-security interest perfected under § 9-113 lasts only ten days).
The seller's § 9-113 perfected security interest will be subject to the perfected security
interest of a party with a floating lien on the buyer's inventory if the latter interest has been
filed and perfected first. U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a). The seller may be accorded the U.C.C. prefer-
ence given purchase money security interests in inventory, see U.C.C. § 9-312(3), if the
interest is perfected under § 9-113 at the time the debtor takes possession of the goods, and
the seller complies with the requirements of § 9-312(3). See note 47 supra. The § 9-113
perfected security interest would prevail over an unperfected floating lien. U.C.C. §§ 9-301;
9-312(5)(a).
"I Samuels lawfully obtained possession of the cattle from the sellers. 526 F.2d at 1250-
51 (Ainsworth, J., dissenting).
1.6 U.C.C. § 9-113. Subject to the exception when the debtor does not have or does not
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ment signed by the debtor must exist in order for the interest to be enforce-
able and a financing statement must be filed in order for the interest to
be perfected."' The reclaiming seller generally has no security agreement
with his buyer."' Thus, where the buyer lawfully obtains possession of
goods, the right of reclamation is not a security interest and it therefore
governed by Article 2 and not Article 9."' The cash seller has a right of
reclamation which operates by law and not by agreement, 2 and the power
to create and perfect a purchase money security interest. Where the buyer
has lawfully obtained possession of the goods, however, these are indepen-
dent rights.'
2 '
lawfully obtain possession of the goods, U.C.C. § 9-113, a security interest is not enforceable
and does not attach to the collateral unless the debtor has signed a security agreement.
U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(a); see 3A DUESENBERO & KING, supra note 90, § 13.03[4], at 13-29.
" U.C.C. §§ 9-203(1)(a); 9-302(a); 9-303; see U.C.C. § 9-113; note 116 supra.
"' See text accompanying notes 90-94 supra.
' If the cash seller's right of reclamation is held subject to Article 2 provisions, the seller
can not reclaim goods from good faith purchasers for value claiming under § 2-403(1). See
U.C.C. § 2-507, Comment 3. Good faith is generally defined by the U.C.C. as "honesty in
fact in the conduct or transaction concerned." U.C.C. § 1-201(19); cf. U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b)
(good faith in the case of a merchant adds the observance of reasonable commercial standards
of fair dealing in the trade to the requirement of honesty in fact). The test of good faith centers
on the state of mind or the intent of the party in question. See Bowling Green, Inc. v. State
Street Bank & Trust Co., 425 F.2d 81, 85 (1st Cir. 1970); Eldon's Super Fresh Stores, Inc. v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 296 Minn. 130, 207 N.W.2d 282, 287 (1973). The
§ 1-201(19) definition of good faith contains no express requirement of a lack of knowledge of
conflicting claims. Other articles of the U.C.C. refine the general definition of good faith for
purposes of those articles, and expressly require lack of knowledge of pre-existing claims.
U.C.C. § 3-302(1); 6-110; 8-301; 8-302; see Industrial Nat'l Bank v. Leo's Used Car Ex-
change, Inc., 291 N.E.2d 603, 606 (Mass. 1973). The fact that other U.C.C. sections expressly
state that lack of knowledge of adverse claims is a component of good faith leads to an
inference that such a lack of knowledge is not a mandatory element of the general definition
of § 1-201(19). When good faith is intended to mean more than honesty in fact, such a
definition is expressly provided. See U.C.C. §§ 3-302(1); 6-110; 8-301; 8-302. Thus, lack of
knowledge of pre-existing claims is not expressly applicable under Article 2. See U.C.C. §§
1-201(19); 2-103(1)(b).
The Samuels court disagreed whether the Article 2 definition of good faith requires lack
of knowledge of adverse claims. The minority argued that C.I.T. was aware of the claims of
the unpaid cash sellers due to C.I.T.'s intimate knowledge of Samuel's operations and finan-
cial status and thus not a good faith purchaser. 526 F.2d at 1256-57 (Ainsworth, J., dissent-
ing); see note 55 supra. The majority simply stated that good faith under Article 2 does not
require lack of knowledge of adverse claims. Id. at 1243-44. The majority supported the
finding that Samuels acted in good faith by asserting that C.I.T. should not have compelled
to continue financing a losing venture. Id. at 1243. C.I.T.'s decision to stop financing Samuels
was clearly motivated by sound business judgment rather than a calculated attempt to obtain
a windfall. Id. at 1243-44. The majority's standard of good faith is not a particularly rigorous
or stringent standard.
I See In re Bel Air Carpets, Inc., 452 F.2d 1210, 1211 (9th Cir. 1971); In re Helms Veneer
Corp., 287 F. Supp. 840, 846 (W.D. Va. 1968); Dugan, supra note 4, at 344-45; text accompa-
nying notes 115-19 supra. A seller is not required to obtain a security agreement under either
§ 2-507(2) or § 2-702(2) in order to reclaim goods.
I See Evans Prods. Co. v. Jorgensen, 245 Ore. 362, 421 P.2d 978, 981 (1966); text
accompanying notes 92-94 supra. Where the buyer lawfully obtains possession of the goods,
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The Samuels minority additionally argued that even if the reclamation
right is a security interest, as the majority concluded, the sellers would still
prevail over C.I.T. because C.I.T.'s security interest was unenforceable
against the sellers.'2 2 UCC section 9-203(1) requires that the debtor grant-
ing the security interest have "rights in the collateral" before a security
interest can attach and become enforceable. 12 3 The Samuels minority
argued that Samuel's rights in the goods were conditioned on honor of the
checks Samuels gave in payment. 12 When the checks were dishonored,
Samuel's rights in the goods were extinguished and therefore C.I.T.'s secu-
rity interest could not attach.'2 The minority stated that the creditor's
rights are derived from and are no greater than the rights of the debtor.
2
1
The majority held, however, that since a purchaser can receive good title
from a defaulting cash buyer under section 2-403(1) and a security interest
is a form of purchase,12 a defaulting buyer can transfer a valid security
interest to a secured party.' 2' Therefore, the defaulting cash buyer has
sufficient rights in the goods to allow attachment of a security interest as
the buyer can transfer a valid interest under section 2-403(1).121
Courts generally have held that a defaulting cash buyer has sufficient
rights in the goods to allow attachment of a perfected floating lien when
the buyer obtains possession of the goods.'2 ' The Samuels minority ignores
the seller's right of reclamation is not an Article 9 unperfected purchase money security
interest because the reclamation right arising under Article 2 is not consensual. The interest
must be made consensual before it will be governed by Article 9. See U.C.C. §§ 9-102; 9-102,
Comment "Purposes;" 9-113, Comment 5.
12 526 F.2d at 1254 (Ainsworth, J., dissenting); 510 F.2d at 150-51; see note 51 supra.
12 U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(c). Section 9-203(1) additionally requires that collateral be in the
possession of the secured party or, if in the possession of the debtor, described within a written
security agreement before the security interest can attach, U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(a), and that
value has been given. U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(b).
"2 510 F.2d at 150; see U.C.C. §§ 2-507(2); 2-511(3).
225 510 F.2d at 150.
26 526 F.2d at 1254 (Ainsworth, J., dissenting); 510 F.2d at 150-51. The minority's con-
cept of derivative title is that if a buyer encumbers goods which he has not paid for a secured
party's interest does not attach to the goods. See WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 94, § 23-4,
at 795. The essence of the derivative title concept is that a secured party cannot acquire any
greater rights than its transferor had. Dugan, supra note 4, at 349-50; see 510 F.2d at 150.
This is little more than a restatement of the maxim that one without title can transfer none
to a good faith purchaser. See text accompanying note 13 supra. The concept of derivative
title does not take into account the radical departure from the prior law effectuated by § 2-
403. See U.C.C. § 2-403; text accompanying notes 27-30 supra; cf. 2 WILuISTON, supra note 7,
§ 346b, at 346 ("And the cases that enforce the right of the seller against the buyer's creditors
or trustees in bankruptcy often rest the decision on the statement that no title passed, rather
than on the ground that creditors are subject to the equities of their debtor.").
2 See note 38 supra.
22 526 F.2d at 1243-44.
I29 d.
'3' See United States v. Wyoming Nat'l Bank, 505 F.2d 1064, 1067-68 (10th Cir. 1974);
Guy Martin Buick, Inc. v. Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank, 184 Colo. 166, 519 P.2d 354, 358-59
(1974); First Nat'l Bank v. Smoker, 157 Ind. App. 71, 286 N.E.2d 203, 208-09 (1972); James
Talcott, Inc. v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 292 Minn. 277, 194 N.W.2d 775, 781, 786 (1972); First-
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the adoption of voidable title in section 2-403(1) and essentially revives the
cash sale doctrine to control the attachment of security interests, adhering
to the concept that the secured party's rights derive from the buyer's rights
in the goods. 3' UCC section 9-203(1)(c) does not require that a debtor have
indefeasible rights in goods before a security interest attaches. Section 9-
203(1) (c) only requires that the debtor have "rights in the collateral" and
is silent on how the debtor's loss of those rights affects attachment. Attach-
ment of a security interest occurs when a limited interest in the collateral
is transferred from the debtor to the secured party and the requisites of
section 9-203(1) have been fulfilled. '32 Because creation of a security inter-
est is a purchase, a defaulting cash buyer may transfer a valid interest to
a good faith purchaser for value by operation of section 2-403(1).'3 Where
a secured party perfects a security interest in after-acquired property and
the debtor acquires possession and voidable title in the after-acquired
goods, the debtor acquires sufficient rights in the goods to allow the secu-
rity interest of the secured party to attach."'
The predominant position among courts is that the holder of a per-
fected floating lien prevails over a reclaiming seller whether the secured
party is a good faith purchaser or a holder of a prior perfected security
Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Academic Archives, Inc., 10 N.C. App. 619, 179 S.E.2d 850,
853-54 (1971); Morton Booth Co. v. Tiara Furniture, Inc., 564 P.2d 210, 214 (Okla. 1977).
"I See 510 F.2d at 150-51; 9 CRMGHTON L. Rxv. 412, 414 (1975); note 126 supra. If a
secured party's security interest does not attach to the goods, he cannot qualify as a good
faith purchaser for value under § 2-403(1) because no purchase of the goods has taken place.
However, attachment under § 9-203(1) and purchase under § 2-403(1) occur simultaneously.
Therefore, when a buyer obtains voidable title and can pass good title to a good faith pur-
chaser for value under § 2-403(1), the buyer has sufficient rights in the collateral to allow the
attachment of a security interest even if the rights are defeasible. See U.C.C. §§ 2-403(1); 2-
403, Comment 1; cf. U.C.C. § 2-501(1) (buyer obtains a "special property" in goods identified
to the contract). A secured party qualifies as a purchaser, U.C.C. § 1-201(32), (33), and a
holder of voidable title can transfer good title to persons who purchase in good faith for value.
U.C.C. § 2-403(1); see text accompanying note 133 infra. The concept of derivative title set
forth by the Samuels minority does not conform to the language of § 2-403(1) which enables
a debtor to transfer or encumber goods for which he has defeasible title. See 510 F.2d at 150-
51.
132 Dugan, supra note 4, at 349; see U.C.C. § 9-203(1).
' See text accompanying notes 27-30 supra. The Samuels minority stated that Samuels
had no right to retain or dispose of the cattle once the checks were dishonored. 510 F.2d at
150. From this, the minority concluded that Samuels no longer had any rights in the goods
to which C.I.T.'s security interest could attach. Id. This conclusion ignores the fact that the
buyer retains voidable title under § 2-403(1) even after the buyer no longer has any right to
retain the goods. Ranchers & Farmers Livestock Auction Co. v. Honey, 552 P.2d 313 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1976); see In re Samuels & Co., 526 F.2d at 1242; U.C.C. § 2-403(1).
'l' See note 132 supra. One court settles the sufficiency of rights-attachment issue as
follows: "Where a debtor gains possession of collateral pursuant to an agreement endowing
him with any interest other than naked possession, the debtor has acquired such rights as
would allow the security interest to attach." Morton Booth Co. v. Tiara Furniture, Inc., 564
P.2d 210, 214 (Okla. 1977). Under U.C.C. § 2-403(1), the buyer receives voidable title along
with possession. This is more than naked possession and provides sufficient rights for a
security interest to attach. See First Nat'l Bank v. Smoker, 157 Ind. App. 71, 286 N.E.2d 203,
208-09 (1972).
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interest.'1 The seller can still sue the buyer on the dishonored check or for
breach of the sales contract, 3 ' but these remedies may be inadequate if the
buyer is insolvent or bankrupt.1 3 In the case of a cash seller, the ineffec-
tiveness of the right of reclamation against a perfected floating lien is
unjust.'38 A seller taking a check in payment for goods is, in effect, being
penalized for not taking other precautions when he is denied reclamation,
a result contrary to the policy of the UCC.' 39 Where the secured party is
an "unconscious purchaser,""'4 the result is particularly onerous. The per-
fected security interest in after-acquired property automatically attaches
to goods the secured party did not finance and may not have even known
of their acquisition. Where the seller believes he has received payment in
full and the secured party has not financed and is not aware of the buyer's
acquisition of the goods, the award of the goods to the secured party over
the valid claim of the seller offends concepts of fairness.'
As long as the language of the UCC permits the holder of a perfected
floating lien to prevail over a reclaiming cash seller, most courts will con-
tinue to enforce the law regardless of its effect.' A major obstacle that
faces the cash seller confronted by a secured party's claim is the ease with
which a secured party can qualify as a good faith purchaser for value under
section 2-403(1).' 45 An amendment to the UCC requiring the holder of an
after-acquired property clause to give new value for newly acquired goods
in order to qualify as a good faith purchaser for value of the goods would
improve the cash seller's position and restrict the "unconscious pur-
chase."'' The new value should be commensurate with the worth of the
newly acquired goods and reasonably concurrent with their acquisition.'45
The unfairness of the "unconscious purchase" will thus be removed al-
though the secured party will still prevail if new value is given.
' See text accompanying notes 68-71, 97, 130, & 134 supra.
'3' See text accompanying notes 65-66 supra.
' In re Samuels & Co., 526 F.2d at 1248 (Gee, J., concurring).
13 See text accompanying notes 90-94 supra.
,3' U.C.C. § 2-511, Comment 4 states in relevant part: "This Article recognizes that the
taking of a seemingly solvent party's check is commercially normal and proper and, if due
diligence is exercised in collection, is not to be penalized in any way."
,40 See text accompanying notes 72-73 supra.
' The Samuels court said any unfairness to the sellers resulting from the U.C.C.'s
operation is illusory for the sellers could have protected their interests had they merely
complied with the U.C.C.'s purchase money provisions. 526 F.2d at 1247-48; see U.C.C. §§
9-107; 9-312(3). The suggestion that cash sellers acquire purchase money security interest
protection is unrealistic, however. See text accompanying notes 90-94 supra.
"I See Mann & Phillips, The Reclaiming Seller and the Bankruptcy Act: A Roadmap of
the Strategies, 18 B. C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REv. 609, 652-53 (1977).
11 The Samuels court held that a secured party is a purchaser for value by definition.
526 F.2d at 1243; see note 70 supra. The good faith test for a secured party is not a difficult
one to meet. See note 119 supra.
"I See note 73 supra. But see U.C.C. §§ 9-108 & 9-204(2).
"1 Cf. U.C.C. § 9-204(2) (security interest under after-acquired property clause does not




The hardship to the cash seller of any "purchase" through a security
interest' could also be mitigated by allowing the secured party/good faith
purchaser for value to claim after-acquired property only to the extent of
the buyer's equity in the property. Such protection based on equitable
principles has been formulated by some courts without an amendment to
the UCC.4 1 Limiting attachment of the secured party's interest to the
buyer's equity in the goods would correct the injustice to the cash seller,
but presently the UCC requires no such limitation and gives to the secured
party priority to all of the goods.' Such a limitation also would nullify the
strained argument that the cash seller should perfect a purchase money
security interest to protect an interest which he reasonably believes needs
no protection." 9
The cash seller's right of reclamation is an Article 2 right and thus not
subject to the provisions of Article 9 governing priority of security interests.
Reclamation is the method provided a cash seller by the UCC to rescind a
sale and is not a manifestation of any reservation of title by the seller,
thereby creating a security interest under UCC section 2-401(1).11 Section
2-507(2) does not require a cash seller to have retained an interest in goods
in order to allow reclamation, but enables the seller to reclaim his goods
when the buyer defaults in payment. 5 ' The argument that the right of
reclamation is a security interest and thus an Article 9 interest is specious
because reclamation is a nonconsensual right of the seller and Article 9
14 See text accompanying note 70 supra.
14 See International Harvester Credit Corp. v. American Nat'l Bank, 296 So.2d 32 (Fla.
1974); note 73 supra; accord, Whitworth v. Krueger, 98 Idaho 65, 558 P.2d 1026, 1044-47
(1976) (Bistline, J., dissenting). Colorado has amended its equivalent of U.C.C. § 2-403 to
read:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, when livestock have been
delivered under a transaction of purchase and on the accompanying brand inspec-
tion certificate or memorandum of brand inspection certificate the seller has con-
spicuously noted that payment of the consideration for the transaction has not been
received, the buyer does not have power to transfer good title to a good faith
purchaser for value until payment is made.
COLO. REv. STAT. § 4-2-403 (Supp. 1976). This amendment does little more than temporarily
protect the seller while the packer has possession of the livestock without paying for them
under grade and yield dealing. See note 40 supra. What the Colorado legislature meant by
"until payment is made" has not been construed by the Colorado courts. To construe "until
payment is made" to mean until the seller has cashed the buyer's check would be excessively
restrictive. The U.C.C. provides 30 days within which to present a check for payment. U.C.C.
§ 3-503(2) (a). Thus, if payment is interpreted as cashing the check, the buyer cannot sell the
meat until the check is honored, which could greatly affect the meat packing industry in
Colorado. If the courts construe the phrase to mean either payment by cash or upon receipt
of the check, the seller is not protected because a security interest can attach before the seller
cashes the check. See text accompanying notes 122-34 supra. In short, the amendment has
not given the cash seller any increased protection.
, See text accompanying notes 122-34 supra.
"' If a secured party cannot attach his interest to goods in which the buyer has no equity,
the seller does not require the protection of a purchase money security interest.
'' See text accompanying notes 80-96 supra.
"' See U.C.C. § 2-507(2) & Comment 3.
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applies generally to consensual interests.'52 Even if one concedes that the
reclamation right is a security interest, the right is not governed by Article
9 unless section 9-113 operates on the nonconsensual right.' 53 Where the
cash buyer lawfully obtains possession of goods and then defaults in pay-
ment, section 9-113 does not give a seller a security interest without strict
compliance with the Article 9 requirements for creation of a security inter-
est.'54 Thus, where no fraud is involved in the sales transaction, the right
of reclamation cannot be a security interest because section 9-113 requires
a security agreement creating the interest and no such agreement is man-
dated by section 2-507(2).55 However, the cash seller's interest in the goods
should be given protection because the check taken in payment by the
seller is presumed to be final payment.' 6 Legislatures and courts should
modify the protection offered to the cash seller in a priority conflict over
goods with a secured party by either requiring the secured party to give
new value in order for his security interest to attach to the goods or limiting
the attachment of the interest to the buyer's equity in the goods.' 7 Until
such protection is offered, the cash seller has no choice but to perfect a
purchase money security interest to insure recovery of his goods or the
proceeds of their sale in the event of a default. Such a remedy is inappro-
priate in a cash sale.' 8 The omissions of the UCC with respect to cash sales
leave the cash seller without a practical remedy upon buyer default and
require redress.
S. RiCHARD ARNOLD
,52 See text accompanying note 108 supra.
15 See text accompanying notes 108-21 supra.
,s See text accompanying notes 116-17 supra.
,5 See U.C.C. § 2-507(2) & Comment 3; text accompanying notes 120-21 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 89-91 supra.
, See text accompanying notes 135-49 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 90-94, 141 supra. Where a cash seller trades with a buyer
on a regular and frequent basis, a purchase money security interest and compliance with
U.C.C. § 9-312(3) offer a cash seller protection which he can and probably should obtain. See
Dugan, supra note 4, at 345, 363 n.93; note 91 supra. The procedure for obtaining a security
agreement, filing a financing statement, and notifying conflicting secured parties of the
seller's prior interest can be done in advance where the seller is involved in an on-going supply
relationship with a buyer. See In re Samuels & Co., 526 F.2d at 1248-49 (Gee, J., concurring);
U.C.C. §§ 9-107; 9-203; 9-302; 9-303; 9-312; Dugan, supra note 4, at 345, 363 n.93. For other
protections for the cash seller against the floating lien, see Note, The Rights of Reclaiming
Cash Sellers When Contested by Secured Creditors of the Buyer, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 934
(1977).
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